

Executive Registry

60-3767

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT : RAND - CIA Relationships

1. My visit to RAND confirms my feeling that it is strongly in CIA's interest to develop direct long-term working relationships with operations research outfits like RAND, SRI, IDA, and ORC:

a. Such cleared research institutes are playing an increasing role in the national security process, more and more on non-technical and interdisciplinary problem areas as well as technical research. To the extent that these institutes have such a role, they are probably just as legitimate customers of CIA as other government agencies. Ergo, it behooves us to insure that they base their analyses and recommendations on the policy sciences on the best available intelligence.

b. Moreover, agencies like RAND are in the intelligence business themselves. Not only do they make intelligence studies but many of their highly influential planning papers, such as those on deterrent postures, have a large threat analysis component. Frequently they see the threat somewhat differently than we do, e.g. the Wohlstetter-Barn-Kahn, etc. view (which has had considerable influence) is quite at variance with such estimates as 11-8. Thus to the extent that we can influence their thinking, it is wise for us to do so.

c. Equally important, "think-factories" like SRI or RAND are an extremely promising source of intellectual inputs to the intelligence process itself. To me, it is at least as useful to get the views of RAND or IDA (or WSRI for that matter) on a problem like that of 11-8 as the views of USIB agencies. If we have confidence in our own estimates we should be eager to test them against informed criticism. The fact that CWT concurred in 11-8 is less significant to me than that RAND tends to disagree with it.

1960

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

410447

SECRET

d. Outfits like RAND could be particularly helpful on those technical and strategic estimates which reach far into the future. For example, II-60 was an indifferent paper largely because it had to be built on contributions from highly conventional intelligence types who simply do not look as far out as do our own R and D people. It would have been far better to consult ARDC, USFG, Kistly's office, RAND, and others on this estimate than to have wasted our time with the service agencies. In an era of exploding technology, intelligence will not be able to keep up with what the enemy is doing unless it stays fully abreast of the thinking of our own research people.

e. RAND and SRI could also be quite helpful on methodologies. To put it crudely, the same analytical techniques which the US employs to study its own defense posture must be used increasingly by intelligence (assuming adequate inputs are available) to study the other side. Since the operations research outfits are already in the business of studying US postures, weapons choices, etc. they are a goldmine here. Frankly, though they have far less data than we do, they appear much more sophisticated in their analytical techniques.

f. Finally, I would value highly the intellectual stimulus of free exchange with people like the RANDsters. We in CIA tend to develop a sort of "superiority complex" because we are generally so far ahead of the other intelligence agencies. Periodic exposure to NSA or RAND (in fact an eventual exchange program) would be a useful cathartic.

2. More and more, as the services are subordinated to DOD, and as DOD itself is forced to share responsibility with key civilian agencies, outfits like RAND will become less tied to the services which originally set them up. RAND is already trying to broaden its clientele; this makes RAND less suspect and more eligible to help us.

3. Moreover, we have as much to give as we have to gain. RAND and its ilk have a desperate need for up-to-date intelligence; hence there is a real incentive for them to seek us out. In this connection, I was impressed with how much CIA has become synonymous with "intelligence" in RAND people's eyes. When they spoke of intelligence estimates they meant NIEs; they have a high regard for our product, which makes them doubly unhappy with the recent complications that are drying up this flow.

4. A serious impediment to our getting the most out of RAND, and helping it in return, is that most of our dealings are still via the Air Force. At best, delays are involved which downgrade the timeliness of the intelligence they get. From a security standpoint the fact that we have only a limited professional relationship with RAND also seriously hampers our ability to use them.

5. CONCLUSION. We should start now to develop long-term across-the-board relationships with the operations research agencies. Though RAND is only one of these, it is the most mature and probably still the best; hence it is probably a good test case (I am thinking here primarily of DDI-type relationships rather than any technical research inputs on the DDP or DDP side);\*

a. Since what we have to offer is largely intelligence data, we must remove the existing road blocks to our releasing material on a regular basis. Under a 1959 USWB decision RAND is now cut off from NIEs, Weeklies, even MIS chapters, it claims. To solve this problem CIA should establish direct working relationships, on a contractual basis if necessary. As a starter we could make more of them "consultants" on a no-fee basis.

b. To do so, we will probably have to alter the present policy of treating research groups as "industrial contractors". There is a world of difference between RAND or SPY's continuing need-to-know and the needs of a company like Boeing or Convair. Why can't we establish a separate category for the research agencies? ✓

c. RAND, in its turn, must be persuaded to play ball re our security regulations. This would become a lot less irritating to them if we could demonstrate the long-term benefits involved.

6. The above ideas may be wide of the mark but I am confident of my basic premise -- that operations research outfits are already of age and it is high time we started using them more. I suspect we all agree in principle; the important thing is to do something about it.

---

\* I am well aware of O/S's long use of SPY, RAND, etc., for contract research, and O/PR's excellent unofficial contacts. My aim is really to multiply such ties and remove the roadblocks.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That DIA initiate planning for development of direct long-term working relationships with the research institutes, perhaps beginning with RAND.

(2) That each DIA office state what values it might get out of such relationships.

(3) That such planning also cover the most effective administrative arrangements for CIA research institute relationships, including the possibilities of creating a separate category for release of info purposes, and of an overall umbrella-type contract to allow optimum flexibility.



25X1